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Abstract
This paper explores the interaction between centralized monetary policy
and decentralized …scal policy in a monetary union. Discretionary mone-
tary policy su¤ers from a failure to commit. Moreover, decentralized …scal
policymakers impose externalities on each other through the in‡uence of
their debt policies on the common monetary policy. These imperfections
can be alleviated by adopting state-contingent in‡ation targets (to com-
bat the monetary policy commitment problem) and shock-contingent debt
targets (to internalize the externalities due to decentralized …scal policy).
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Although the Maatricht Treaty has laid the institutional foundations forEuropean
Monetary Union (EMU), how these institutions can best be operated in practice
remains to be seen in the coming years. For example, the European Central Bank
(ECB) has announced a two-tier monetary policy strategy based on a reference
value for money growth and an indicator that is based on a number of other
measures, such as output gaps, in‡ation expectations, etcetera (see European
Central Bank, 1999). Over time the ECB may well shift to implicit targeting of
in‡ation. Indeed, a number of economists has argued (e.g, see Svensson, 1998)
that also the Bundesbank has pursued such a strategy. Furthermore, how the
Excessive De…cit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact (see Beetsma and
Uhlig, 1999) will work in practice is not yet clear.
This paper deals with the interaction between in‡ation targets and constraints
on decentralized …scal policy in a monetary union. To do so, we extend our earlier
work on the interaction between a common monetary policy and decentralized
…scal policies in a monetary union. In particular, in Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1999) we showed that monetary uni…cation raises debt accumulation, because in
a monetary union countries only partly internalize the e¤ects of their debt policies
on future monetary policy. This additional debt accumulation is actually welfare
enhancing (if the governments share societal preferences). We showed that, in
the absence of shocks, making the central bank su¢ciently conservative (in the
sense of Rogo¤, 1985, that is by imposing on the central bank a loss function
that attaches a su¢ciently high weight to price stability) can lead the economy to
the second-best equilibrium. However, this is no longer the case in the presence
of common shocks, as the economies are confronted with a trade o¤ between
credibility and ‡exibility.
While Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) emphasized the e¤ects of lack of com-
mitment in monetary policy, this paper introduces another complication in the
form of strategic interactions between decentralized …scal policymakers who have
di¤erent views on the stance of the common monetary policy.1 These di¤erent
views originate in di¤erences among the economies in the monetary union. In
particular, we allow for systematic di¤erences in labour and product market dis-
tortions, public spending requirements and initial public debt levels. We also
allow for idiosyncratic stochastic shocks hitting the countries. In combination
with the decentralization of …scal policy these di¤erences lead to con‡icts about
the preferred future stance of the common monetary policy. In particular, coun-
tries that su¤er from severe distortions in labor and commodity markets, feature
1Our earlier model incorporated another potential distortion: the possibility that govern-
ments discount the future at a higher rate than their societies do. We ignore this distortion
throughout the current paper.
2higher public spending or initial debt levels or are hit by worse shocks prefer a
laxer future stance of monetary policy. These con‡icts about monetary policy
induce individual governments to employ their debt policy strategically, so as to
induce the union’s central bank to move monetary policy into the direction they
prefer. This strategic behavior imposes negative externalities on other countries,
thereby producing welfare losses.
In contrast to Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999), we do not address the distor-
tions in the model by making the common central bank su¢ciently conservative.
Instead, we focus on state-contingent in‡ation targets which, in contrast to a con-
servative central bank, can lead the economy to the second-best equilibrium if
countries are identical. Hence, as stressed by Svensson (1997) in a model with-
out …scal policy and debt accumulation, in‡ation targets eliminate the standard
credibility-‡exibility trade-o¤. If …scal policy is decentralized to heterogeneous
countries, however, the optimal state-contingent in‡ation targets need to be com-
plemented by (country-speci…c) debt targets to establish the second best. In this
way, in‡ation targets address the lack of commitment in monetary policy, while
debt targets eliminate strategic interaction among heterogeneous governments
with di¤erent views about the common monetary policy stance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3discussesthe second-best equilibriumin which not only monetary
but also …scal policy is centralized and in which monetary policy is conducted
under commitment. This is the second-best optimum that can be attained under
monetary uni…cation, assuming that the supranational authorities attach an equal
weight to the preferences of each of the participating countries. Section 4 derives
the equilibrium for the case of a common, discretionary monetary policy with
decentralized …scal policies. Section 5 explores institutional arrangements (i.e.
in‡ation targets and public debt targets) that may alleviate the welfare losses
arising from the lack of monetary policy commitment and the wasteful strategic
interaction among the decentralized governments. Finally, Section 6 concludes
the main body of this paper. The derivations are contained in the appendix.
2. The model
A monetary union, which is small relative to the rest of the world, is formed by
n countries.2 A common central bank (CCB) sets monetary policy for the entire
union, while …scal policy is determined at a decentralized, national level by the n
governments. There are two periods.
2Monetary uni…cation is taken as given. Hence, we do not explore the incentives of countries
to join a monetary union.
3Workers are represented by trade unions who aim for some target real wage
rate (e.g. see Alesina and Tabellini, 1987, and Jensen, 1994). They set nominal
wages so as to minimize the expected squared deviation of the realized real wage
rate from this target. Monetary policy (i.e., the in‡ation rate) is selected after
nominal wages have been …xed. In each country, …rms face a standard production
function with decreasing returns to scale in labour. Output in period t is taxed
at a rate ¿it. Therefore, output in country i in periods 1 and 2, respectively, is
given by3
xi1 = º (¼1 ¡ ¼
e
1 ¡ ¿i1) ¡ ¹ ¡ ²i; (2.1)
xi2 = º (¼2 ¡ ¼
e
2 ¡ ¿i2); (2.2)
where ¹ represents a common union-wide shock, while ²i stands for an idiosyn-
cratic shock that solely hits country i. ¼e
t denotes the in‡ation rate for period t
expected at the start of period t (that is, before period t shocks have materialized,
but after period t ¡ 1;t ¡ 2;:: shocks have hit). We assume that E[²i] = 0;8i;




i=1²i = 0.4 The variances of ¹ and
²i are given by ¾2
¹ and ¾2
², respectively. We abstract from shocks in the second
period, because they would not a¤ect debt accumulation.
Each country features a social welfare function which is shared by the govern-
ment of that country. Hence, governments are benevolent. In particular, the loss











t + (xit ¡ ~ xit)
2 + ®g (git ¡ ~ git)
2i
;0 < ¯ ￿ 1; ®¼;®g > 0:
(2.3)
Welfare losses increase in the deviations of in‡ation, (log) output and government
spending (git is government spending as a share of output in the absence of distor-
tions) from their targets (or …rst-best levels or “bliss points”). For convenience,
the target level for in‡ation corresponds to price stability. The target level for
output is denoted by ~ xit > 0. Two distortions reduce output below this optimal
level. First, the output tax ¿it drives a wedge between the social and private
bene…ts of additional output. Second, market power enables unions to drive the
real wage above its level in the absence of distortions. Hence, even in the ab-
sence of taxes, output is below the …rst-best output level ~ xit > 0. The …rst-best
3Details on the derivations of these output equations can be found in Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1999).
4Without this assumption, the mean ¹ ² of the ²’s would play the same role as ¹ does. In the
outcomes given below, ¹ would then be replaced by ^ ¹ ´ ¹+¹ ². For convenience, we assume that
¹ ² = 0.
4level of government spending, ~ git, can be interpreted as the optimal share of non-
distortionary output to be spent on public goods if (non-distortionary) lump-sum
taxes would be available (see Debelle and Fischer, 1994). The target levels for
output and government spending can di¤er across countries. Parameters ®¼ and
®g correspond to the weights of the price stability and government spending ob-
jectives, respectively, relative to the weight of the output objective. Finally, ¯
denotes society’s subjective discount factor.
Government i’s budget constraint can be approximated by (e.g., see Appendix
A in Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999):
git + (1 + ½)di;t¡1 = ¿it + Â¼t + dit; (2.4)
where di;t¡1 represents the amount of public debt carried over from the previous
period into period t, while dit stands for the amount of debt outstanding at the
end of period t. All public debt is real, matures after one period, and is sold on
the world capital market against a real rate of interest of ½. This interest rate is
exogenous because the countries making up the monetary union are small relative
to the rest of the world.5 ¿it and Â (a constant) stand for, respectively, distor-
tionary tax revenue and real holdings of base money as shares of non-distortionary
output. All countries share equally in the seigniorage revenues of the CCB, so
that the seigniorage revenues accruing to country i amount to Â¼t.
We combine (2.4) with the expression for output, (2.1) or (2.2), to eliminate
¿it. The resulting equation can be rewritten to yield the government …nancing
requirement of period t:
GFRit = ~ Kit + (1 + ½)di;t¡1 ¡ dit + ±t (¹ + ²i)=º
= [(~ xit ¡ xit)=º] + Â¼t + (~ git ¡ git) + (¼t ¡¼
e
t); (2.5)
where ±t is an indicator function, such that ±1 = 1 and ±2 = 0, and where
~ Kit ´ ~ git + ~ xit=º.
The government …nancing requirement, GFRit, consists of three components. The
…rst component, ~ Kit, amounts to the government spending target, ~ git, and an out-
put subsidy aimed at o¤setting the implicit output tax due to labor- or product-
market distortions, ~ xit=º. Thesecond component involvesnet debt-servicing costs,
5In the following, we will occasionally explore what happens when the number of union
participants becomes in…nitely large (i.e. n ! 1) in order to strengthen the intuition behind
our results. In these exercises the real interest rate remains beyond the control of union-level
policymakers.
5(1 + ½)di;t¡1¡dit. The …nal component (in period 1 only) is the stochastic shock
(scaled by º), (¹ + ²i)=º. The last right-hand side of (2.5) represents the sources
of …nance: the shortfall (scaled by º) of output from its target (henceforth re-
ferred to as the output gap), (~ xit ¡xit)=º, seigniorage revenues, Â¼t, the shortfall
of government spending from its target (henceforth referred to as the spending
gap), ~ git ¡ git, and the in‡ation surprise, ¼t ¡ ¼e
t.
All public debt is paid o¤ at the end of the second period (di2 = 0;i =
1;::;n). Under this assumption, while taking the discounted (to period one) sums
of the left- and right-hand sides of (2.5) (t = 1;2), we obtain the intertemporal
government …nancing requirement:









where ~ Fi ´ ~ Ki1+(1 + ½)di0+ ~ Ki2=(1 + ½) stands for the deterministic component
of the intertemporal government …nancing requirement.
Monetary policy is delegated to a common central banker (CCB), who has
direct control over the union’s in‡ation rate. One could assume that the CCB has
certain intrinsic preferences regarding the policy outcomes. Alternatively, and this
is the interpretation we prefer, one could assume that the CCB is assigned a loss
function by means of an appropriate contractual agreement. More speci…cally, this
agreement shapes the CCB’s incentives in such a way (by appropriately specifying
its salary and other bene…ts – for example, possible reappointment – conditional


















(xit ¡ ~ xit)




t is the in‡ation target in period t, which may be di¤erent from the
socially-optimal in‡ation rate, which was set at zero.
If ¼¤
1 = ¼¤
2 = 0, the CCB’s objective function corresponds to an equally-
weighted average of the individual societies’ objective functions. We assume that
¼¤
2 is a linear function of di1;i = 1;::;n. This linearity assumption su¢ces for our
purposes: we will see later on that the optimal second-period in‡ation target is
indeed a linear function of di1;i = 1;::;n. The optimal …rst-period in‡ation target
will be a function of di0, which is exogenous.
63. The second-best equilibrium
As a benchmark for the remainder of the analysis, we discuss the equilibrium
resulting from centralized …scal and monetary policies under commitment. Mon-







where the VS;i are given by (2.3), i = 1;::;n. Equation (3.1) assumes that coun-
tries have equal bargaining power as regards to the …scal policy decisions taken
at the union level. Government spending is residually determined, so that the
CCB, when it selects monetary policy, internalizes the government budget con-
straints. The resulting equilibrium is Pareto optimal. In the sequel, we refer to
this equilibrium as the second-best equilibrium. In the absence of …rst-best policies
(such as the use of lump-sum taxation and the elimination of product- and labor-
market distortions), it is the equilibrium with the smallest possible welfare loss
(3.1), given monetary uni…cation. The derivation of the second-best equilibrium
is contained in Appendix A.
3.1. In‡ation, the output gap and the public spending gap
Table 1 contains the outcomes for in‡ation, the output gap,6 ~ xit ¡ xit, and the
spending gap, ~ git ¡ git. We write each of these outcomes as the sum of two
deterministic and two stochastic components. ~ F ¢
i is the deviation of country i’s
deterministic component of its intertemporal government …nancing requirement
from the cross-country average, de…ned by ~ F. Formally, ~ F ´ 1
n
Pn
j=1 ~ Fj and
~ F¢
i ´ ~ Fi¡ ~ F. The factor between square brackets in each of the entries of Table 1
makes clear how, within a given period, the government …nancing requirement is
distributed over the …nancing sources (seigniorage, the output gap, the spending
gap and an in‡ation surprise). Indeed, for each period these factors add up to
unity, both across the deterministic and across the stochastic components. For
example, for the …rst period one has:
6Throughout, we present the outcome for the output gap instead of the outcome for the tax
rate. The reason is that, in contrast to the latter, the former directly enters the welfare loss
functions.






















= ~ Ki1 + (1 + ½)di0 ¡ d
S
i1 + (¹ + ²i)=º; (3.2)
where dS
i1 is the second-best debt level. The last equality can be checked by
substituting (3.4)-(3.7) into (3.3) (all given below) and substituting the resulting
expression into the last line of (3.2). For each of the outcomes, the terms that
follow the factor in square brackets regulate the intertemporal allocation of the
intertemporal government …nancing requirement.
The coe¢cients of the common stochastic shock
¹
º (in the fourth column of
Table 1, °2) di¤er in two ways from the coe¢cients of the common determinis-
tic component of the intertemporal government …nancing requirement ~ F (in the
second column of Table 1, °0). The …rst di¤erence is with respect to the …rst-
period, intratemporal, allocation of the government …nancing requirement over
the …nancing sources. The deterministic components of the government …nancing
requirement are anticipated and thus correctly incorporated in expected in‡a-
tion. The common shock, in contrast, is unanticipated and, hence, not taken into
account when in‡ation expectations are formed. The predetermination of the in-
‡ation expectation is exploited by the central policymakers so as to …nance part of
this common shock through an in‡ation surprise. Indeed, whereas the coe¢cient
of ¼1 ¡ ¼e
1 is zero in the second column in Table 1, this coe¢cient is positive in
the fourth column, indicating that part of the common shock is …nanced through
an in‡ation surprise in the …rst period. With surprise in‡ation absorbing part of
the common shock, the output gap and the spending gap have to absorb a smaller
share of this shock.
In the second period, the allocation over the …nancingsources forthe stochastic
component
¹
º is the same as for the deterministic component ~ F. The reason
is that the …rst-period shock
¹
º has materialized before second-period in‡ation
expectations are formed. The e¤ect of
¹
º on the second-period outcomes will thus
be perfectly anticipated. Indeed, the share of
¹
º that is transmitted into the second
period through debt policy becomes part of the deterministic component of the
second-period government …nancing requirement (when viewed from the start of
the second period).
The second way in which the coe¢cient of the stochastic shock
¹
º di¤ers from
the coe¢cient of ~ F, involves the intertemporal allocation of the government …-
nancing requirement. In particular, the share of
¹
º absorbed in the …rst period
(relative to the second period) is larger than that of ~ F (¯
¤(P¤=P)c1 > ¯
¤c0 and
c1 < c0, where c0 and c1 are de…ned in Table 1). The reason is again that …rst-
8period in‡ation expectations are predetermined when the stochastic shock hits.
This enables the policymakers to absorb a relatively large share of the stochastic
shock in the …rst period through an in‡ation surprise.




di¤er from the responses to ~ F and
¹
º. Since in‡ation is attuned to cross-country




º . Accordingly, taxes(the output gap) and the government spending gap have
to fully absorb these country-speci…c components of the government …nancing
requirements.
3.2. Public debt policy


















~ K1 + (1 + ½) ¹ d0 ¡ ~ K2
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; n > 1; (3.5)






















; n > 1; (3.7)
= 0; n = 1;
where the superscript “S” stands for “second-best equilibrium”, the superscript
“e” denotes the expectation of a variable, an upperbar above a variable indicates
its cross-country average (except for variables carrying a tilde, like ~ K1, where
the cross-country average is indicated by dropping the country-index), a super-
script “¢” denotes an idiosyncratic deviation of a deterministic variable from its
cross-country average (for example, ~ K¢
i1 ´ ~ Ki1 ¡ ~ K1), a superscript “d” denotes
9the response to a common shock, a superscript “±” indicates the response to an
idiosyncratic shock, and where
¯





¤ ´ (Â + 1)
2=®¼ + 1=º
2 + 1=®g:
Hence, optimal debt accumulation (3.3) is the sum of two deterministic compo-
nents and two stochastic components. The component ¹ d
e;S
1 optimally distributes
over time the absorption of the cross-country averages of the deterministic compo-
nents of the government …nancing requirements. Therefore, it is common across
countries. The country-speci…c components d
¢;e;S
i1 intertemporally distribute the
idiosyncratic deterministic components of the government …nancing requirements.
The common (across countries) component ¹ d
d;S
1 represents the optimal debt re-
sponse to the common shock ¹, while d
±;S
i1 stands for the optimal debt response
to the country-speci…c shock, ²i.
The debt response to the common shock is less active than the response to
the idiosyncratic shock (since P¤=P > 1). The common in‡ation rate can exploit
the predetermination of in‡ation expectations only in responding to the common
shock, because the common in‡ation rate can not be attuned to idiosyncratic
shocks. Hence, the share of the common shock that can be absorbed in the …rst
period can be larger than the corresponding share of the idiosyncratic shock.
Public debt thus needs to respond less vigorously to the common shock.
4. Discretionary monetary policy with decentralized …scal
policy
This section introduces two distortions compared with the second-best equilib-
rium explored in the previous section. First, the CCB is no longer able to commit
to monetary policy announcements. Second, …scal policy is decentralized to in-
dividual governments, which may result in wasteful strategic interaction among
heterogeneous governments.
From now on, the timing of events in each period is as follows. At the start
of the period, the institutional parameters are set. That is, an in‡ation target is
imposed on the CCB for the coming period and, if applicable, the debt targets
on the individual governments are set. The in‡ation target may be conditioned
on the state of the world. In particular, the in‡ation target may depend on the
average debt level in the union.7 Furthermore, the debt target, which represents
7The optimal in‡ation target can either be optimally reset at the start of each period, or
10the amount of public debt that a government has to carry over into the next
period, may be shock-contingent.8 After the institutional parameters have been
set, in‡ation expectations are determined (through the nominal wage-setting pro-
cess). Third, the shock(s) materialize. Fourth, taking in‡ation expectations as
given, the CCB selects the common in‡ation rate and the …scal authorities simul-
taneously select taxes and, in the absence of a debt target, public debt. Each of
the players takes the other players’ policies at this stage as given. Finally, public
spending levels are residually determined. As a result, the CCB internalizes the
e¤ect of its policies on the government budget constraints.
This section explores the outcomes under pure discretion, i.e. in the absence
of both in‡ation targets (i.e., ¼¤
1 = ¼¤
2 = 0) and debt targets. The complete
derivation of the equilibrium is contained in Appendix B. The suboptimality of
the resulting equilibrium compared to the second best motivates the exploration
of in‡ation and debt targets in Section 5.
4.1. In‡ation, the output gap and the public spending gap
Table 2 contains the solutions for the in‡ation rate, the output gap and the spend-
ing gap. The main di¤erence compared to the outcomes under the second-best
equilibrium (see Table 1) is that, for a given amount of debt di1 to be carried
over into the second period, expected …rst-period in‡ation (and, hence, seignior-
age if Â > 0) will be higher (compare the term between the square parenthe-
ses in the second column and the second row of Table 2 with the correspond-
ing term in Table 1 and observe that [Â(Â + 1)=®¼]=S > (Â2=®¼)=P, where
S ´ Â(Â + 1)=®¼ + 1=º2 + 1=®g). The source of the higher expected in‡ation
rate under pure discretion is the inability to commit to a stringent monetary
policy, which yields the familiar in‡ation bias (Barro and Gordon, 1983). The
outcomes for in‡ation, the output gap and the spending gap deviate from the
outcomes under the second-best equilibrium also because debt accumulation un-
der pure discretion di¤ers from debt accumulation under the second best. These
di¤erences are discussed below.
4.2. Public debt policy
Government i’s debt can, analogous to (3.3), be written as:
d
D









be determined according to a state-contingent rule selected at the beginning of the …rst period.
These two alternative interpretations yield equivalent results.
8Debt at the end of the second period is restricted to be zero. Hence, the second period
features a debt target of zero.
11where the superscript “D” is used to indicate the solution of the purely discre-





~ K1 + (1 + ½)d0 ¡ ~ K2
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; if n > 1; (4.3)






















; if n > 1; (4.5)
= 0; if n = 1;
and where
S ´ Â(Â + 1)=®¼ + 1=º
2 + 1=®g; (4.6)
S
¤ ´ Â(Â + 1)=®¼ + (Â + 1)=(n®¼) + 1=º
2 + 1=®g;
Q ´ [(n ¡1)=n][Â(Â + 1)=®¼] + 1=º
2 + 1=®g:
4.2.1. Response to the common deterministic components of the gov-
ernment …nancing requirements
Positive analysis:
This subsection explores the solution for expected average debt ¹ d
e;D
1 in (4.2).
Whereas current in‡ation expectations are predetermined at the moment that
debt is selected, future in‡ation expectations still need to be determined. A re-
duction in debt reduces the future government …nancing requirement and, thus,
the tax rate in the future. This, in turn, weakens the CCB’s incentive to raise
future in‡ation in order to protect employment. Hence, by restraining debt ac-
cumulation, governments help to reduce future in‡ation expectations, which are
endogenous from a …rst-period perspective. The reduction in future in‡ation
expectations implies a lower in‡ation bias in the future. In other words, asset
accumulation is an indirect way to enhance the commitment of a central bank to
low future in‡ation.
12Expected average debt ¹ d
e;D




¤(S¤=S)] < 0 and because S¤=S is decreasing in n – see Beetsma and Boven-
berg, 1999): in a larger union, each individual government perceives a smaller
e¤ect of a unilateral reduction in public debt on the common future in‡ation rate.
Hence, the incentive to restrain debt becomes weaker.9 Indeed, in a monetary
union, the credibility of the common monetary policy has the features of a public
good.
Normative analysis:
Expected average debt accumulation is suboptimally low (because S¤=S > 1,
¯
¤(S¤=S) > ¯
¤ and, hence, ¹ d
e;D
1 < ¹ d
e;S
1 – see also Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999).
The source of this underaccumulation of debt is the lack of commitment in mon-
etary policy, which gives rise to an in‡ation bias. In order to strengthen the
credibility of future monetary policy and thus reduce the in‡ation bias, govern-
ments try to exploit the predetermined nature of …rst-period in‡ation expectations
by absorbing a relatively large part of the intertemporal government …nancing re-
quirement in the …rst period. In equilibrium, these attempts to exploit the …xed
nature of in‡ation expectations are ine¤ective, however, because the private sector
anticipates the incentive facing the governments to exploit …rst-period in‡ation
expectations and thus sets …rst-period wages (in‡ation expectations) higher than
under commitment. Hence, the …rst-period equilibrium in‡ation rate, output gap
and spending gap will be higher than under commitment. If the union becomes
arbitrarily large (i.e. n ! 1), individual governments are no longer able to a¤ect
the credibility of the common future monetary policy. This source of underaccu-
mulation of debt thus disappears. Hence, as n ! 1, ¹ d
e;D
1 = ¹ d
e;S
1 .
4.2.2. Response to country-speci…c deterministic components of the
government …nancing requirements
Positive analysis:
This subsection investigates the response of public debt to the deviations of
the deterministic components of the government …nancing requirements from the
corresponding cross-country averages, d
¢;e
i1 . In equilibrium, these country-speci…c
deviations of the …nancing requirements are fully absorbed by …rst- and second-
period deviations of output and public spending from their targets. The reason
is that monetary policy and, hence, in‡ation is attuned to the average conditions
9An analogous mechanism features in Cukierman and Lippi (1999), who explore how the
(nominal) wage demands of trade unions change as a result of a switch from national monetary
policymaking to a monetary union. In a monetary union, trade unions internalize the in‡ationary
consequences of higher wage demands to a lesser extent. Hence, the incentive to restrain wages
is weakened.
13in the union and thus does not respond to the country-speci…c components of the
government …nancing requirements.
Inspection of (4.3) and the de…nition of Q reveals that, if Â > 0, an in-
crease in n weakens the (positive) response of debt to the …rst-period component
~ K¢
i1 + (1 + ½)d¢
i0 > 0, while it strengthens the negative response to ~ K¢
i2 > 0 (i.e.,
the response becomes more negative). To explain the intuition behind these ef-
fects, we …rst consider the case with ~ K¢
i1 + (1 + ½)d¢
i0 > 0 and ~ K¢
i2 = 0. In that
case, expected debt accumulation in country i exceeds average expected debt accu-
mulation in the union, i.e. d
¢;e;D
i1 > 0. Hence, government i has a relatively large
need for seigniorage revenues in the second period so that its preferred second-
period in‡ation rate is relatively high (if Â > 0). This discrepancy between gov-
ernment i’s preferred second-period in‡ation rate and the preferred second-period
in‡ation rate of the average union member, as well as the fact that government i
in the …rst period acts as a Stackelberg leader against the CCB in the second pe-
riod, induces government i to strategically further raise its debt.10 The resulting
higher second-period tax rate forces the CCB to raise the second-period in‡ation
rate (of course, in equilibrium, the in‡ation rate is una¤ected by country-speci…c
factors, but this is neglected by the individual, optimizing government). However,
in a larger union the e¤ect of such an increase in debt on the common in‡ation
rate will be diluted and, hence, the incentive to use debt strategically is weaker.
Now, suppose that ~ K¢
i2 > 0 and ~ K¢
i1 + (1 + ½)d¢
i0 = 0. Debt accumulation by
country i will be below average, while the need for seigniorage revenues in the
second period will be relatively large. Hence, government i’s preferred second-
period in‡ation rate will be relatively high (if Â > 0). Therefore, it raises debt
strategically (compared with the case in which seigniorage is absent) to force the
CCB to bring the future in‡ation rate more in line with its own preferred future
in‡ation rate. Again, in a larger union the e¤ect of unilateral changes in debt
accumulation on the common in‡ation rate is weaker and, hence, the incentive to
raise debt strategically is weaker. Hence, in a larger union, d
¢;e;D
i1 will be lower,
ceteris paribus.11
Normative analysis:
10First-period debt and …rst-period in‡ation are simultaneously chosen, while the monetary
and …scal policymakers take each other’s decisions as given. Therefore, when selecting debt,
governments ignore the e¤ect of …rst-period debt on …rst-period seigniorage.
11If ￿= 0, preferences concerning the second-period in‡ation rate are the same across gov-
ernments and, hence, governments will not strategically use debt. Indeed, if ￿= 0, d
¢;e;D
i1 is
una¤ected by n. Within the context of our simple model, therefore, the presence of seigniorage
revenues is crucial for countries to engage in strategic debt accumulation. However, govern-
ments may di¤er in their preferences about future monetary policy for other reasons as well (for
example, a di¤erent timing of business cycles). In that case, governments may also strategically
use debt policy to a¤ect the future stance of monetary policy.
14Countries with relatively severe product and labor market distortions, or high
initial debt levels (i.e., countries with ~ F¢
i > 0), feature a relatively high country-
speci…c expected debt component. In fact, these countries overaccumulate debt
(at least as far as the debt component d
¢;e;D





opposite holds true for countries with a relatively low intertemporal government
…nancing requirement (i.e. ~ F¢
i < 0). Governments featuring a high intertemporal
government …nancing requirement (i.e. ~ F¢
i > 0) overaccumulate debt in order
to encourage the CCB to raise in‡ation in the second period, thereby bringing
second-period in‡ation more in line with these governments’ preferred in‡ation
rate. These governments fail to internalize the negative externalities of this be-
havior on the governments with relatively small distortions or low initial debt.
Similarly, governments with low intertemporal government …nancing requirements
(i.e. ~ F¢
i < 0) do not internalize the negative externalities on other governments
associated with the underaccumulation of debt. Hence, although in equilibrium
average expected debt and in‡ation are una¤ected, this failure to internalize the
negative externalities of suboptimal debt accumulation leads to wasteful strate-
gic behavior by causing the country-speci…c deterministic components of public
debt to deviate from their values in the second-best equilibrium. A larger union























; if n ¸ 2; (4.7)
which is negative (positive) if ~ F¢










becomes smaller so that the welfare loss that originates in strategic behavior
declines.
4.2.3. Response to the common shock.
Positive analysis:
This subsection turns to the response of debt policy to the common shock ¹.
As is the case for the second-best equilibrium, the share of the common stochastic
shock ¹ that is absorbed in the …rst period is larger than the share of the common
deterministic component of the intertemporal government …nancing requirement
~ F that is absorbed in the …rst period (see Table 2 and note that P¤ > S).
Monetary uni…cation (i.e., an increase from n = 1 to n > 1) intensi…es the
response of public debt to unanticipated supply shocks (see (4.4) and note that
12Since ¯




¤ (Q=S)] < (>)0 if ~ F ¢





i1 if ~ F¢
i > (<)0.
15¯
¤(S¤=S) is declining in n). Hence, in a monetary union, governments engage in
more active debt stabilization policies to union-wide shocks than under national
policy making.
The reason for more active debt stabilization is as follows. Fiscal authorities
choose to absorb a relatively large part of an adverse …rst-period supply shock
immediately in order to exploit the predetermination of …rst-period in‡ation ex-
pectations. As a result, second-period in‡ation expectations will to a lesser extent
be a¤ected by the common shock and, hence, in‡ation variability will be smaller in
the second period. In a monetary union, however, this e¤ect is smaller than under
national monetary policymaking because each individual union member perceives
a relatively small e¤ect of its actions on the future variability of the union-wide
in‡ation rate. A monetary union thus yields more variability of public debt and
future in‡ation. Accordingly, even if shocks are shared by the countries, monetary
uni…cation results in more active debt stabilization.
Normative analysis:
Is the additional variability of debt produced by monetary uni…cation exces-
sive? Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) show that, given that the CCB is not able













This response is actually attained with national monetary policymaking (i.e.,
n = 1). As explained above, monetary uni…cation (n > 1) leads to a more active
response of debt to common shocks (i.e. for ¹ > 0, ¹ d
d;D
1 > ¹ d
d;opt
1 ). The larger re-
sponse of debt to uniform shocks is welfare reducing. Intuitively, reducing future
in‡ation variability is a public good in a monetary union. Hence, individual coun-
tries freeride on each other when taking measures to reduce in‡ation variability.
The coe¢cient of
¹
º in (4.8) issmallerthan thecorrespondingcoe¢cient in (3.6)
in the second-best equilibrium (since S2 < P¤P). Hence, the response of debt to
common shocks, as prescribed by (4.8), is too “conservative” when compared to
the second best (i.e. for a bad shock (¹ > 0), ¹ d
d;opt
1 < ¹ d
d;S
1 ). By absorbing more of
¹ in the …rst period, this shock has less of an e¤ect on future in‡ation expectations
and, hence, the future in‡ation bias due to a lack of commitment in monetary
policy.
Debt policy given by ¹ d
d;opt
1 thus deviates from ¹ d
d;S
1 as a result of the trade-
o¤ between future monetary policy credibility and a suboptimal distribution of
welfare losses over time. This trade-o¤ is a variant of the well-known “credibility-
‡exibility” trade-o¤. In this particular case, ‡exibility refers to activeness of the
response of debt, rather than in‡ation, to shocks; to enhance the credibility of
16future monetary policy, the government reduces its ‡exibility in employing public
debt to absorb shocks.
4.2.4. Response to the idiosyncratic shock.
Positive analysis:
Like the country-speci…c deterministic components of the intertemporal gov-
ernment …nancing requirement (see Subsection 4.2.2), the idiosyncratic shock ²i
is exclusively dealt with at the national level through …scal policy. A bad id-
iosyncratic shock (i.e., ²i > 0) raises the idiosyncratic debt component, d
±;D
i1 .13
Inspection of (4.5) and the de…nition of Q makes clear that, if Â > 0, an increase
in n weakens the response of d
±;D
i1 to ²i (i.e., the coe¢cient of ²i=º in (4.5) becomes
smaller). In other words, and in contrast to the response of debt to a common
shock, debt responds less actively to idiosyncratic shocks as the union becomes
larger. Hence, contrary to common wisdom, in a larger union a country will use
less debt stabilization in response to country-speci…c shocks.
The explanation is the same as the earlier explanation for the dependency of
d
¢;e;D
i1 on the number of union participants. If country i is hit by a bad shock
²i > 0, it issues more debt than the average government in the union. Hence, if
Â > 0, government i has a relatively large need for seigniorage revenues in the
second period and, hence, its preferred in‡ation rate in that period is relatively
high. Government i thus strategically raises debt further to bring future in‡ation
more in line with its preferred in‡ation rate. In a larger union, the perceived
in‡uence of government i’s policies on the common monetary policy is reduced
and, hence, the incentive to use debt strategically is weakened. If Â = 0, all
governments share the same preferences concerning the common second-period
in‡ation rate.14 Hence, governments have no reason to use debt strategically.
Indeed, in that case, d
±;D
i1 does not depend on the number of countries.
13d
±;D
i1 is zero in the case of national monetary policymaking (i.e., n = 1). In that case, ²i = 0
(as we have assumed that the cross-country average of the idiosyncratic shocks is zero). This
constraint has explicitly been used in the derivation of the equilibrium. If we had assumed that
²i 6= 0, then
¹
º in (4.4) would have been replaced with
¹+¹ ²
º , but d
±;D
i1 would have remained at
zero.
14Although country i may have been hit by a relatively bad shock ²i > 0, suggesting a larger
need for in‡ation as a stabilizating tool, its preferred second-period in‡ation rate does not di¤er
from the other governments’ preferred in‡ation rate. The reason is that second-period in‡ation
expectations adjust for the part of the shock that is transmitted into the second period. Hence,
in the second period in‡ation no longer has a role in stabilizing the e¤ects of ²i on the economy.
17Normative analysis:




i1 reveals that the response of debt to idiosyn-
cratic shocks is more vigorous than under the second-best equilibrium. A larger
union renders the debt response less active. The associated reduction in wasteful
strategic interaction boosts welfare. If the union becomes in…nitely large (i.e.,
n ! 1), d
±;D
i1 converges to d
±;S
i1 and the response of debt to idiosyncratic shocks
becomes optimal. In that case, all wasteful strategic interactions are eliminated.
4.2.5. Summary of the e¤ects of a larger union
If the number of countries goes to in…nity and all strategic interactions among the






i1 all converge to
the same response coe¢cients 1=(1 + ¯
¤(1 + ½)). This response is in fact optimal
(compare (4.2) with (3.4), (4.3) with (3.5) and (4.5) with (3.7) for n ! 1).
The response ¹ d
d;D
1 to the common shock, in contrast, is optimal and equal to
(4.8) if n = 1. It becomes excessive if n > 1, and the more so the larger the
union becomes. Hence, only the response of debt to the common shock will be
suboptimal for n ! 1. Actually, the welfare loss associated with this response
is largest in an in…nitely large union. Even though for n ! 1 the debt response
to idiosyncratic shocks is more active than the response to common shocks, the
former is optimal, while the latter is excessive.
5. Optimal institutional arrangements
This section investigates institutional adjustments that can help the monetary
union to reach better equilibria. In particular, we allow for in‡ation targets. The
second-period in‡ation target may depend on …rst-period debt levels and, thereby,
indirectly, on …rst-period shocks. In addition, we allow for debt targets. These
debt targets should be hit exactly. Hence, they act as debt ceilings when they
prevent overaccumulation of debt, while they act as debt ‡oors when they prevent
underaccumulation of debt. The debt targets may depend on the shocks, i.e. one
can write dT
i1 = dT
i1(¹;²i), where the superscript “T” stands for “target”. In‡ation
targets can be viewed as a contractual way to deal with the commitment problem
in monetary policy. In the same way, debt targets are a contractual way to address
externalities.
In‡ation targets can be enforced by giving the central banker …nancial incen-
tives to meet the target or by making reappointment of the central banker de-
pendent upon meeting the target.15 Reputational considerations may also help to
15This is the case for New Zealand – see Walsh (1995) for a detailed account of this arrange-
ment.
18enforce in‡ation targets. The announcement of an in‡ation target provides mar-
ket participants with a benchmark against which the central banker can be held
accountable. Failure to meet the target indicates a lack of willingness or ability
on the side of the central banker to stick to the announcements. This information
will be taken into account when future in‡ation expectations are formed.
Debt targets may be enforced through peer pressure (the loss of political pres-
tige if the target is missed) and …nes. Indeed, under the so-called Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP), EMU participants who persistently violate the ceilings on
public de…cits will be …ned (for more details on the SGP, see Artis and Winkler,
1998, and Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998).16 In the sequel, we assume that both
the in‡ation and the debt targets can be enforced.
This section explores how institutional rearrangements (in‡ation targets and
debt targets) can induce optimal responses of debt to the various components of
the intertemporal government …nancing requirement. In particular, it will inves-
tigate whether these arrangements ensure that debt accumulation mimics debt
accumulation in the second-best equilibrium.
5.1. Identical economies ( ~ Ki1 = ~ K1, ~ Ki2 = ~ K2, di0 = d0 and ²i = 0, 8i)
This subsection assumes that the union participants are completely identical.
Hence, the deterministic components of the government …nancing requirements
are equal across the countries ( ~ Ki1 = ~ K1, ~ Ki2 = ~ K2 and di0 = d0, 8i), while id-
iosyncratic shocks are absent (²i = 0, 8i). As a result, all governments adopt iden-
tical policies. The solution for di1 consists only of the response to the deterministic
components of the average intertemporal government …nancing requirement and
the response to the common shock. Potential strategic interactions arising from
a disagreement about the common monetary policy are absent. Hence, optimal
institutional design needs to address only the lack of commitment of monetary
policy. Appendix C proves the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose that ~ Ki1 = ~ K1, ~ Ki2 = ~ K2, di0 = ¹ d0 and ²i = 0, 8i. In




















~ K2 + (1 + ½)h
i
; (5.2)
with h equal to the cross-country average realized debt level ¹ d1, ensures that
the decentralized, discretionary equilibrium coincides with the second-best equi-
librium.
16Under exceptional circumstances (in particular, a large fall in GDP) the sanctions envisaged
by the Pact may be waived. This aspect of the Pact to some extent resembles the contingent
nature of the debt targets explored in this section.
19Proposition 1 reveals that, in contrast to making the central banker conserva-
tive à la Rogo¤ (1985) – see Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) –, the state-contingent
in‡ation target succeeds in establishing the second best (see also Svensson, 1997,
and Beetsma and Jensen, 1999). A conservative central bank addresses the com-
mitment problem (the in‡ation bias), but at the same time distorts the stabi-
lization of shocks. A state-contingent in‡ation target, in contrast, addresses the
in‡ation bias without distorting stabilization. Thus, the contractual solution to
the commitment problem (à la Svensson, 1997) dominates the solution of dele-
gation (à la Rogo¤, 1985). The contract, however, needs to be quite rich. In
particular, the in‡ation target needs to be state-contingent, because the size of
the (second-period) in‡ation bias depends on the amounts of debt issued by the
union participants. A state-independent in‡ation target would not be able to
establish the second best.
By addressing the commitment problem through a state-contingent in‡ation
target, one also eliminates the intertemporal distortions that originate in the
lack of monetary policy credibility. In particular, by setting the second-period
in‡ation target at the proposed level (5.2), the second-period in‡ation bias is
eliminated. Accordingly, without a second-period in‡ation bias, governments in
the …rst period no longer perceive the need to underaccumulate (for the purpose of
enhancingthe credibility of monetary policy in the second period) debt in response
to the deterministic components of the government …nancing requirement. The
absence of the second-period in‡ation bias also takes away the need to absorb an
excessively large share of the common shock in the …rst period and thus ensures
an optimal debt response to ¹. Finally, by setting the …rst-period in‡ation target
conform (5.1), the …rst-period in‡ation bias is eliminated.
5.2. Di¤erences among countries
This subsection allows for cross-country di¤erences both in the deterministic com-
ponents of the government …nancing requirements (i.e., ~ Ki1; ~ Ki2 and di0) and in
the stochastic shocks (i.e., the ²i’s are no longer assumed to be zero). As ex-
plained in Section 4, such di¤erences among countries produce con‡icts about the
preferred future stance of the common monetary policy. The con‡icts result in
wasteful strategic interactions between decentralized …scal policymakers. Debt
targets eliminate these con‡icts of interest and the associated costly strategic
interactions.
The following proposition is proven in Appendix D:
20Proposition 2. With deterministic di¤erences in the government …nancing re-
quirements and with idiosyncratic shocks, the combination of in‡ation and debt
targets that minimizes VU is obtained by setting the …rst- and second-period in-
‡ation targets at, respectively, (5.1) and (5.2), with h equal to the cross-country
average realized debt level ¹ d1, and the (speci…c) debt target dT
i1 on country i
(i = 1;::;n) at dT








i1 . The resulting equilibrium coincides
with the second-best equilibrium.
By imposing debt targets attuned to each country’s speci…c situation, the
union can thus eliminate the externalities associated with the strategic behavior
of the individual governments. Hence, with the proposed in‡ation and debt targets
in place, the responses of public debt (and the other policy instruments) mimic
their counterparts under the second-best equilibrium. In particular, compared
with the purely discretionary equilibrium, debt targets restrict debt to be less
active in response to the country-speci…c components of the government …nancing
requirements ( ~ F¢
i and
²i
º ). They thus operate as a ceiling on the associated debt
responses if ~ F ¢
i > 0 or
²i
º > 0, and as a ‡oor if ~ F ¢
i < 0 or
²i
º < 0. Only if Â = 0 or
n ! 1, are debt targets redundant and are optimal in‡ation targets su¢cient for
the discretionary equilibriumto coincide with the second-best equilibrium. In that
case, no debt targets are needed, because the e¤ect of a unilateral change in debt
on seigniorage revenues becomes negligible and any strategic e¤ects disappear.
6. Conclusion
This paper investigated the interaction between …scal policy and monetary policy
in a monetary union. Our analysis has allowed for two imperfections. One is
the lack of monetary policy commitment. The other involves spillovers among
decentralized …scal policymakers. We explored how in‡ation targets and debt
targets can alleviate the welfare losses arising from these imperfections.
With identical economies, imposing the optimal state-contingent in‡ation tar-
get on the common central bank is su¢cient to establish the second-best equi-
librium. If countries are heterogeneous, however, the in‡ation target needs to
be complemented by debt targets. These debt targets eliminate the strategic,
welfare-reducing interactions among governments arising from di¤erences among
the union participants on the preferred stance of monetary policy. The in‡ation
and debt targets can be viewed as acontractual solution to the lack of commitment
in monetary policy and the spillovers among the decentralized …scal policymakers.
The analysis can be extended into a variety of directions. One extension would
be to allow for a longer modelling horizon and to explore the optimal, dynamic
paths for the in‡ation and debt targets. In particular, it would be interesting to
21explore whether debt targets converge over time for countries with di¤erent initial
debt levels. Another extension is to investigate whether and how the debt targets
can be enforced. Indeed, the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact is
subject to some doubt. Such an analysis would require a dynamic framework that
accounts for reputational considerations. The countries with the smallest product-
and labor-market distortions and the countries with the lowest initial debt level
can be expected to most favor strict enforcement of the targets. In a multiperiod
context, these countries will take into account the e¤ects on the future behavior
of governments (in terms of debt policies) of a failure to enforce the targets.
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We will use the following conventions: superscript e denotes the subjective
expectation of a variable. When no confusion is possible, it is also used to denote
the mathematical (model-induced) expectation. The deviation of some variable
yit from its expected value is denoted by superscript “d”: yd
it = yit ¡ ye
it. An




exception is a variable with a tilde, whose cross-country average is denoted by the












t = ¹ yt ¡ ¹ ye
t. Superscript “¢” denotes the deviation of a variable from its cross-
country average: y¢
it = yit ¡ ¹ yt. Note that y
¢;e
it = ye
it ¡ ¹ ye
t. Finally, superscript “±”
is used to denote the deviation of a country-speci…c variable from the sum of its
expected value and the cross-country average di¤erence between this variable and




it + ¹ yd
t
´
= yit ¡ ¹ ye
t ¡ y
¢;e
it ¡ ¹ yd
t. Hence, using our





it , i.e. the sum
of the cross-country average expectation, the di¤erence between the expectation
of yit and the average expectation, the cross-country average prediction error,
and the di¤erence between yit and its expectation plus the cross-country average
prediction error.
Assumption:
As in the main text, the sum of the idiosyncratic shocks is assumed to be zero:
Pn
i=1²i = 0.
1. Derivation of the second-best equilibrium
Both monetary and …scal policymaking are centralized. Moreover, monetary pol-
icy is conducted under commitment. The supranational centralized …scal author-
ity (CFA) minimizes an equally-weighted average of the participating countries’
social objectives. In solving for the equilibrium, we work backwards, starting with
the second period.
1.1. Period 2
First, we solve for the second-period outcomes, given the …rst-period debt choices.











[º (¼2 ¡ ¼
e
2 ¡ ¿i2) ¡ ~ xi2]






where µ2 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the rational expectations
constraint in period 2. The CCB’s …rst-order conditions with respect to ¼2 and
¼e
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+ µ2 = 0:
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2 + [º (¼2 ¡ ¼
e
2 ¡ ¿i2) ¡ ~ xi2]
2 + ®g [¡(1 + ½)di1 + ¿i2 + Â¼2 ¡ ~ gi2]
2o
:
The …rst-order conditions with respect to the ¿i2 can be written as:
º [º (¼2 ¡ ¼
e
2 ¡ ¿i2) ¡ ~ xi2] = ®g [¡(1 + ½)di1 + ¿i2 + Â¼2 ¡ ~ gi2];8i: (1.2)
Imposing rationality of expectations (and noting that, in equilibrium, realiza-
tions coincide with expectations), we can write (1.1) and (1.2) as:











~ Ki2 + (1 + ½)di1 ¡ Â¼2
i
;8i: (1.4)



























. The resulting equation can be rewritten to yield the solution for in‡a-












2 + 1=®g; (1.7)
as de…ned in the main text. Combine this with (1.4) to eliminate ¼2 and rewrite




































~ K2 + (1 + ½) ¹ d1
io
;8i: (1.9)
Take expecations of (1.2), use that in period 2 realizations match expectations
and combine the result with (1.8) to obtain the solution for ~ gi2 ¡ gi2:













































We now move back to solve for the …rst-period outcomes. The Lagrangian of the











[º (¼1 ¡ ¼e
1 ¡¿i1) ¡ ¹ ¡ ²i ¡ ~ xi1]
2+




+2¯L2 + 2µ1fE[¼1] ¡ ¼
e
1g;
where µ1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the rational expectations (of
in‡ation) constraint in period 1. Note that L2 is not a¤ected by ¼1. Therefore,
the CCB’s …rst-order conditions with respect to ¼1 and ¼e





fº [º (¼1 ¡ ¼
e







º [º (¼1 ¡¼
e
1 ¡ ¿i1) ¡ ¹ ¡ ²i ¡ ~ xi1]
¾
+ µ1 = 0;





fº [º (¼1 ¡ ¼
e







º [º (¼1 ¡¼
e
1 ¡ ¿i1) ¡ ¹ ¡ ²i ¡ ~ xi1]
¾
= 0: (1.11)
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The …rst-order conditions with respect to ¿i1 and di1 (i = 1;::;n) can be written
as:
¡º [º (¼1 ¡ ¼
e












~ K2 + (1 + ½) ¹ d1
i
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~ K2 + (1 + ½) ¹ d1
io
(1 + ½):
Finally, we can rewrite the …rst-period government budget constraint as:
~ Ki1 + (1 + ½)di0 = (¿i1 + ~ xi1=º) + Â¼1 + (~ gi1 ¡ gi1) + di1;8i: (1.14)
The system of …rst-order conditions to be solved is thus given by (1.11), (1.12),
(1.13) and (1.14). Take some country-speci…c policy variable yi1 (yi1 = ¼i1;¿i1;gi1
or di1). We will solve for yi1 by solving for each of the components of the decom-
position of yi1 into yi1 = ¹ ye
1 + y
¢;e
i1 + ¹ yd
1 +yD
i1, where ¹ ye
1 will be the response to the
cross-country average of the deterministic components of the government …nanc-
ing requirements, y
¢;e
i1 will be the response to the country-speci…c deterministic
components of the government …nancing requirements, ¹ yd
1 will be response to the
common shock and yD
i1 will be the response to the idiosyncratic shock. We thus
compute the solutions to these variables in four steps.
1.2.1. Steps 1 and 2
Take expectations across (1.11), (1.12), (1.13) and (1.14) to yield:
®¼¼
e

















~ Ki1 + (1 + ½)di0 = (¿
e
i1 + ~ xi1=º) + Â¼
e





Step 1: Computation of expectations of cross-country averages. Take cross-
country averages across (1.15)-(1.18) to yield:
®¼¼
e






























~ K1 + (1 + ½) ¹ d0 = (¹ ¿
e
1 + ~ x1=º) + Â¼
e
1 + (~ g1 ¡ ¹ g
e
1) + ¹ d
e
1: (1.22)
Using (1.19), (1.20) and (1.22), one can solve for the expected cross-country av-






































Combining this last equation with (1.21) to eliminate ~ g1¡¹ ge
1, we can solve for the















¤ = ¯ (1 + ½); (1.25)
and where (here and in the sequel) a superscript “S” stands for “second best”.
Substitute (1.24) back into the expressions for ¼e
1, ¹ ¿e















































where the last expression follows upon combining (1.27) and (2.1).
Step 2: Computation of country-speci…c expected deviations from cross-country













































































































i1 + (1 + ½)d¢
i0 ¡ ~ K¢
i2
i






1.2.2. Steps 3 and 4












































































































1 ¡ ¹ g
d
1 + ¹ d
d
1; (1.41)
The solution for ¼d
1, ¹ ¿d
1, ¹ gd
1 and ¹ xd










































¤ = (Â + 1)
2=®¼ + 1=º
2 + 1=®g; (1.42)
as de…ned in the main text. Combine the expression for ¹ gd
1 with (1.41) to give the













Step 4: Computation of responses to idiosyncratic shocks. Substract the sys-













































































2. Derivation of the decentralized equilibrium
We now solve the model for the case of a centralized, discretionary monetary pol-
icy and a decentralized …scal policy. We allow for the possibility of a constant
(possibly zero) in‡ation target or a state-contingent in‡ation target which is a lin-
ear function of the individual countries’ debt choices. The case of pure discretion
is obtained when the in‡ation target is restricted to zero in both periods. The
model is solved through backwards induction.
2.1. Period 2
We compute the second-period policy outcomes, conditional on …rst-period debt
choices. Substitute (2.2) and
gi2 = ¡(1 + ½)di1 + ¿i2 + Â¼2;















2 ¡¿i2) ¡ ~ xi2)






2 is a constant (possibly zero) or a linear function of the individual coun-
tries’ debt choices. The CCB’s …rst-order condition is:







[º (º (¼2 ¡ ¼
e
2 ¡ ¿i2) ¡ ~ xi2) + Â®g (gi2 ¡ ~ gi2)] = 0: (2.1)






2 + [º (¼2 ¡¼
e
2 ¡¿i2) ¡ ~ xi2]
2 + ®g [¡(1 + ½)di1 + ¿i2 + Â¼i2 ¡ ~ gi2]
2o
:
The …rst-order condition is:
¡º [º (¼2 ¡¼
e
2 ¡ ¿i2) ¡ ~ xi2] + ®g (gi2 ¡ ~ gi2) = 0;8i: (2.2)
Furthermore, we can write the second-period government budget constraint as:
~ Ki2 + (1 + ½)di1 = (¿i2 + ~ xi2=º) + Â¼2 + (~ gi2 ¡gi2): (2.3)
Take (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) together and impose that ¼e
2 = ¼2. The system to




2(¹ ¿2 + ~ x2=º) + Â®g (~ g2 ¡ ¹ g2); (2.4)
º
2(¿i2 + ~ xi2=º) = ®g (~ gi2 ¡ gi2); (2.5)
~ Ki2 + (1 + ½)di1 = (¿i2 + ~ xi2=º) + Â¼2 + (~ gi2 ¡gi2): (2.6)
Take the cross-country average of (2.5) and combine the resulting equation with








(¹ ¿2 + ~ x2=º): (2.7)
Take the cross-country average of (2.6) and combine this with (2.7) to eliminate
¼2 from (2.6). Combine the result with the cross-country average of (2.5) to
eliminate ~ g2 ¡ ¹ g2. We end up with:











S = Â(Â + 1)=®¼ + 1=º
2 + 1=®gS; (2.9)
























~ K2 + (1 + ½) ¹ d1
i
: (2.10)
Furthermore, we can combine (2.5) and (2.6) to yield





(¿i2 + ~ xi2=º) + Â¼2:
Combine this with (2.10) to eliminate ¼2. Rewrite the result to yield:






























































Combine this with (2.5) to …nd that:












































































































































































































































(º (¼1 ¡ ¼e
1 ¡ ¿i1) ¡ ¹ ¡ ²i ¡ ~ xi1)
2+








Hence, the …rst-order condition is:







[º (º (¼1 ¡ ¼
e
1 ¡ ¿i1) ¡ ¹ ¡ ²i ¡ ~ xi1) + Â®g (gi1 ¡ ~ gi1)] = 0:
(2.15)





1 + [º (¼1 ¡ ¼e
1 ¡ ¿i1) ¡ ¹ ¡ ²i ¡ ~ xi1]
2+





The …rst-order conditions are:
¡º [º (¼1 ¡ ¼
e
1 ¡ ¿i1) ¡ ¹ ¡ ²i ¡ ~ xi1] + ®g (gi1 ¡ ~ gi1) = 0; (2.16)





















































































Finally, we can rewrite the …rst-period government budget constraint as:
~ Ki1 + (1 + ½)di0 = (¿i1 + ~ xi1=º) + Â¼1 + (~ gi1 ¡ gi1) + di1: (2.18)
The system of …rst-order conditions to be solved is thus given by (2.15), (2.16),
(2.17) and (2.18). Take some country-speci…c policy variable yi1 (yi1 = ¼i1;¿i1;gi1
or di1). We will solve for yi1 by solving for each of the components of the decom-
position of yi1 into yi1 = ¹ ye
1 +y
¢;e
i1 + ¹ yd
1 + y±
i1, where ¹ ye
1 will be the response to the
cross-country average of the deterministic components of the government …nanc-
ing requirements, y
¢;e
i1 will be the response to the country-speci…c deterministic
components of the government …nancing requirements, ¹ yd
1 will be response to the
common shock and y±




i1 = 0. We thus compute the solutions of the variables in four steps.
2.2.1. Steps 1 and 2














i1 + ~ xi1=º) = ®g (~ gi1 ¡ g
e
i1); (2.20)






















































































~ Ki1 + (1 + ½)di0 = (¿
e
i1 + ~ xi1=º) + Â¼
e







2 is the expectation about the second-period in‡ation target, formed




is constant (possibly zero), because ¼¤
2 is a constant or a linear function of the
individual countries’ debt choices.
Step 1: Computation of expectations of cross-country averages. Take cross-
country averages across (2.19)-(2.22) to yield the following system (again making

















1 + ~ x1=º) = ®g (~ g1 ¡ ¹ g
e
1); (2.24)






















































































~ K1 + (1 + ½) ¹ d0 = (¹ ¿
e
1 + ~ x1=º) + Â¼
e
1 + (~ g1 ¡ ¹ g
e
1) + ¹ d
e
1: (2.26)













1 + ~ x1=º):
Combine this equation and (2.24) with (2.26) to eliminate both ~ g1 ¡ ¹ ge
1 and ¼e
1,
to obtain after rewriting:
(¹ ¿
e











































Hence, combining this last equation with (2.25) to eliminate ~ g1¡¹ ge
1 and rewriting
yields:












































































¤ = Â(Â + 1)=®¼ + (Â + 1)=(n®¼) + 1=º
2 + 1=®g; (2.31)
as de…ned in the main text. Hence,
¹ d
e






































































One obtains ¹ d
e;D







@di1 in (2.32) all drop out.
Step 2: Computation of country-speci…c expected deviations from cross-country


























































































































Combining the latter equation with (2.34) gives:
~ K
¢


































@di1 = 0, one can easily solve for d
¢;e;D
i1 given in the main text.
2.2.2. Steps 3 and 4
Subtract equations (2.19)-(2.22) from equations (2.15)-(2.18), respectively, to give
































































































































Step 3: Responses to common shocks. In step 3 we solve for ¼d
1, ¹ ¿d
1 = ¹ ¿1 ¡ ¹ ¿e
1,
¹ gd
1 = ¹ g1¡ ¹ ge
1 and ¹ dd
1 = ¹ d1 ¡ ¹ de
1, which are the policy responses to the common
shock ¹. We take the cross-country averages of the system we just obtained and



























+ º¹ + ®g¹ g
d








































































1 ¡ ¹ g
d
1 + ¹ d
d
1: (2.46)
One can solve (2.43), (2.44) and (2.46) to obtain the solutions for the variables
















































Finally, we can solve for ¹ dd
1 by combining (2.45) and (2.47). We can solve for ¹ d
d;D
1
if we set ¼¤






Step 4: Computation of responses to idiosyncratic shocks. These responses are
de…ned as ¿±
i1 ´ ¿d
i1 ¡ ¹ ¿d
1, g±
i1 ´ gd
i1 ¡ ¹ gd
1 and d±
i1 ´ dd
i1 ¡ ¹ dd
1. The relevant system
that needs to be solved is obtained by subtracting (2.43)-(2.46) from (2.39)-(2.42),























































Q = [(n ¡ 1)=n][Â(Â + 1)=®¼] + 1=º
2 + 1=®g; (2.51)


















By substituting the right-hand side of (2.52) into (2.49), we can solve for d±
i1. In
addition, if we set ¼¤
2 = 0 (hence,
@¼¤
2
@di1 = 0), we obtain the solution for d
±;D
i1 .
3. Proof of Proposition 1
Let ~ Ki1 = ~ K1, ~ Ki2 = ~ K2, di0 = d0 and ²i = 0, 8i. Hence, di1 = ¹ d1. We pursue the
following strategy in proving Proposition 1. First, we derive the value ¼¤
2(¹ d1) for
¼¤
2, which can be written as ¼¤






1), that replicates the second-




1 that replicates the …rst-period policy outcomes under the
second best, for given ¹ de









into (2.30), which is then solved for ¹ de
1. Finally, we plug ¼
¤;d
2 (¹ dd
1) into (2.45) to
solve for ¹ dd
1. The resulting solutions for ¹ de
1 and ¹ dd
1 turn out to coincide with the
corresponding outcomes in the second-best equilibrium.
For given ¹ d1, the optimal in‡ation target ¼¤
2(¹ d1) is the one that yields the





~ K2 + (1 + ½) ¹ d1
i
. Hence, we solve
for ¼¤



















~ K2 + (1 + ½) ¹ d1
i
;
which is obtained by equating the right-hand side of the …rst equation in (1.6)
with the right-hand side in (2.10). The solution is:
¼
¤





~ K2 + (1 + ½) ¹ d1
i
: (3.1)
17These are the outcomes that would have been obtained from the computations in Appendix
B had we constrained debt accumulation in country i to ¹ d1.
41It is easy to check that forthisvalue of the in‡ation target, the other second-period










(1 + ½): (3.2)
For given ¹ de
1, the optimal in‡ation target ¼¤
1(¹ de





~ K1 + (1 + ½)d0 ¡ ¹ de
1
i
. Hence, we solve ¼¤
1(¹ de










































It is easy to check that for this value of the in‡ation target, the other …rst-period
variables attain their second-best equilibrium values, given ¹ de
1.
Having noticed that for these in‡ation targets the intratemporal allocation of
the government …nancing requirements is optimal (i.e. according to the second-
best equilibrium), for given debt policy, we now need to check that for these
in‡ation targets debt policy coincides with debt policy in the second-best equilib-
rium. To this end, substitute ¼¤
1, given by (3.3),
@¼¤
2













into (2.30). It is easy to see that the …nal two terms in (2.30) cancel out against
each other. It is then straightforward to solve the resulting equation to yield
¹ de
1 = ¹ d
e;S
1 .








(1 + ½) ¹ d
d
1;
(obtained by substracting the expectation of (3.1) from (3.1)) into (2.45). Let’s










































































































2 + 1=®g: (3.4)

































The right-hand side of this equation can be written as ¯
¤(1 + ½) ¹ dd
1=P. Using this,
we can solve the equation to give ¹ dd
1 = ¹ d
d;S
1 . This completes the proof.
4. Proof of Proposition 2
First, we derive the equilibrium when a debt target dT
i1 is imposed on country i,
i = 1;::;n. This debt target is the exact amount of debt that country i has to
carry over into the second period. After having derived the equilibrium, we prove
Proposition 2.
4.1. Derivation of the equilibrium with debt targets dT
i1, i = 1;::;n.
In deriving the equilibrium, we closely follow the derivations of the decentralized
equilibrium in Appendix B.
4.1.1. Period 2
We replace di1 with dT
i1 in the derivation of the second-period outcomes in Ap-
pendix B and, consistent with the notation we used so far, we use ¹ dT
1 to denote the
cross-country average of the individual countries’ debt targets. The second-period















































































analogous to (2.10), (2.12) and (2.13), respectively.
4.1.2. Period 1
Because …rst-period debt is no longer a choice variable, the relevant …rst-order
conditions for government i are:







[º (º (¼1 ¡ ¼
e
1 ¡ ¿i1) ¡ ¹ ¡ ²i ¡ ~ xi1) + Â®g (gi1 ¡ ~ gi1)] = 0;
(4.4)
¡º [º (¼1 ¡ ¼
e
1 ¡ ¿i1) ¡ ¹ ¡ ²i ¡ ~ xi1] + ®g (gi1 ¡ ~ gi1) = 0; (4.5)
~ Ki1 + (1 + ½)di0 = (¿i1 + ~ xi1=º) + Â¼1 + (~ gi1 ¡ gi1) + d
T
i1; (4.6)
analogous to (2.15), (2.16) and (2.18), respectively.
We solve now for the …rst-period outcomes. As before, we solve for these in















i1 + ~ xi1=º) = ®g (~ gi1 ¡ g
e
i1); (4.8)
~ Ki1 + (1 + ½)di0 = (¿
e
i1 + ~ xi1=º) + Â¼
e





Step 1: Solution in terms of cross-country averages. Take cross-country aver-














1 + ~ x1=º) = ®g (~ g1 ¡ ¹ g
e
1); (4.11)
44~ K1 + (1 + ½) ¹ d0 = (¹ ¿
e
1 + ~ x1=º) + Â¼
e
1 + (~ g1 ¡ ¹ g
e
1) + ¹ d
T;e
1 : (4.12)
















































Step 2: Country-speci…c expected deviations from cross-country expected aver-
ages. Subtract (4.11) and (4.12) from (4.8) and (4.9), respectively, which gives

















































































Step 3: Responses to common shocks. Subtract (4.7)-(4.9) from (4.4)-(4.6),






































































1 = 0; (4.20)




1 ¡ ¹ g
d
1 + ¹ d
T;d
1 : (4.21)
































Step 4: Computation of responses to idiosyncratic shocks. The relevant system























































4.2. Proof of Proposition 2
We show that by setting the individual countries’ debt targets at dT


































as proposed in Proposition 2, the second-best equilibrium is attained. Hence, this
combination of in‡ation and debt targets mimimizes VU.
Substitute expression (4.26) into (4.1) in order to eliminate ¼¤
2. The resulting











46Because we set ¹ dT
1 = ¹ d
e;S
1 + ¹ d
d;S
1 in Proposition 2, we substitute the solutions for
¹ d
e;S
1 and ¹ d
d;S





















which is the expression for ¼2 given in Table 1.
We can proceed in a similar fashion to show that under the proposed combi-
nation of targets ~ gi2 ¡ gi2, ~ xi2 ¡ xi2, ¼1, ~ gi1 ¡ gi1 and ~ xi1 ¡ xi1 all coincide with
their second-best counterparts. This completes the proof.
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